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Beyond Chapter VI and a Half: The Evolution and Future of UN Peacekeeping Missions

Over more than seven decades, UN peacekeeping missions have embodied a multilateral effort to alleviate human suffering in conflict settings, while also serving as a constant model of collective responsibility and international cooperation. This long journey cannot be fully understood without the legal framework provided by the Charter of the United Nations, nor without recognizing the decisive participation of successive Secretaries-General, who at every stage have promoted initiatives and reforms aimed at optimizing the effectiveness of these operations.
The UN Charter, signed on June 26, 1945, at the San Francisco Conference, is the foundational pillar establishing the principles and purposes of the Organization. It sets out the legal basis for the prevention and management of conflicts, especially through Chapters VI, concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes, and VII, dealing with actions in response to threats to peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression. Although the Charter does not explicitly mention peace missions, they rely on these chapters to function as adaptable mechanisms that lie between preventive diplomacy and stronger collective action. The second Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, described their uniqueness by referring to “operations under Chapter VI and a half,” acknowledging that they lie in a space between political persuasion and the use of force, should the situation require it.
In its early years, the Organization was undergoing a period of institutional consolidation. Under Trygve Lie (1946–1952), there were still no clear provisions for tackling the emergence of conflicts in various regions, although the features of what would become multilateral cooperation were beginning to take shape. With Dag Hammarskjöld (1953–1961), decisive steps were taken, evidenced by the 1956 United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), created to curb the escalation of the Suez Crisis, and the 1960 United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), deployed to support Congolese independence and contain internal violence, despite the high human cost, including the death of Hammarskjöld himself in 1961.
Following his death, U Thant (1961–1971) consolidated an active presence strategy. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), established in 1964, illustrates the desire to prevent a latent conflict from turning into a regional confrontation. Meanwhile, Kurt Waldheim (1972–1981) led the UN during the Cold War, and the Organization continued to rely on observation or interposition missions, such as the 1974 United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), intended to prevent renewed hostilities between Israel and Syria in the Golan Heights. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (1982–1991) managed negotiations in different parts of the world, facilitated by the waning of the Cold War, granting broader international leeway to address internal conflicts.
Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s term (1992–1996) saw a notable increase in peace operations, concurrent with the end of the East-West confrontation. In 1992, he presented An Agenda for Peace, a document underscoring the importance of active diplomacy, prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction as central pillars of missions. During the 1990s, the UN conducted complex missions such as UNTAC in Cambodia, ONUSAL in El Salvador, and UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, with varied results that demonstrated the Organization’s limitations in operational and political terms when Member States’ consensus was lacking. The events in Rwanda in 1994 and Srebrenica in 1995, despite the presence of Blue Helmets, highlighted the gulf between the formal existence of a mission and its actual capacity to protect the civilian population. In Rwanda’s case, the United Nations Assistance Mission (UNAMIR) was unable to stop the systematic killing of Tutsis and moderate Hutus, starkly revealing the gap between a peace initiative and its operational effectiveness.
In that climate of skepticism, Boutros-Ghali faced harsh criticism, and the Security Council was embroiled in debates over a potentially stronger intervention. Kofi Annan (1997–2006) succeeded him as Secretary-General with a career closely tied to peacekeeping, thus enabling him to push for reforms aimed at revitalizing and modernizing the UN’s effectiveness. This effort was brought together with the creation of a High-Level Panel led by Lakhdar Brahimi, which identified errors and laid out concrete recommendations for missions. The so-called Brahimi Report, from August 2000, called for the end of “token mandates” lacking sufficient resources, urged improved coordination among the Security Council, the Secretariat, and contributing countries, and recommended bolstering deployment speed, intelligence capabilities, and the integration of humanitarian and human rights considerations.
The adoption of these proposals was broadly favorable, although not all Member States followed them with equal determination. They served as a roadmap for equipping missions with a more multidisciplinary structure and prioritizing civilian protection in their mandates. Under Ban Ki-moon (2007–2016) and António Guterres (2017–present), the UN persisted in emphasizing prevention, early mediation, and the interplay of peace, development, and human rights. However, disagreements over financing and the willingness to take political and military risks have remained. Each new mission in South Sudan, Mali, or the Democratic Republic of the Congo tested the Organization’s diplomatic and logistical capabilities, striving not to repeat past mistakes.
This panorama reveals the constantly evolving nature of UN peace missions, molded by successes, failures, and continuous recalibrations. Having started with cease-fire supervision, their mandates expanded to include civilian protection, the rebuilding of state institutions, and the oversight of transitional justice. Although their legitimacy arises from the UN Charter and Security Council resolutions, their strength ultimately depends on political convergence and the material commitment of Member States.
The Brahimi Report became a decisive turning point, giving impetus to improvements designed to address the most evident weaknesses and propose structural remedies. Since then, despite obstacles and reluctance, the Organization has kept refining its methods with the hope that Blue Helmets will not only keep present crises in check, but also help lay the groundwork for future reconciliation. In this way, peace missions reinforce that collective ideal of safeguarding life and dignity for all, in keeping with the spirit of the United Nations Charter: “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”
In 2024, at the Future Summit and with the adoption of the Pact for the Future in September, the idea of continuously modernizing and adapting peacekeeping operations has been reaffirmed. The intention is to reshape the role of Blue Helmets into a more inclusive and effective scheme, recognizing the necessity of protecting civilians in armed conflicts, devoting greater attention to the Women, Peace and Security agenda, and actively considering the role of youth in peace processes. This new agreement commits to crisis prevention, enhanced diplomacy, and a broad campaign against terrorism and transnational crime. It also addresses emerging issues linked to artificial intelligence and space exploration, underscoring a shared resolve to renew multilateralism, defend human rights, and build a sustainable peace.
In line with that vision, the document Our Common Agenda, presented by the Secretary-General in 2021, offers a more comprehensive and strategic perspective for confronting global challenges. Since its publication, policies have been developed that strengthen its approach, acknowledging the urgency of reviewing peace operations in contexts of prolonged conflicts and technological advances, and emphasizing the need to use digital tools and data analysis to improve crisis monitoring. Similarly, civilian protection is reinforced by insisting on the thorough application of the laws of war, the prevention of gender-based violence, and the safeguarding of fundamental rights in highly complex environments. There is a push for collaboration with regional organizations, as well as an increase in preventive diplomacy so the UN can act before conflicts escalate, highlighting the inclusion of a gender perspective and the leading role of youth in peace processes. Furthermore, missions are encouraged to be innovative and flexible, conceived as malleable structures capable of adapting to emerging or transnational conflicts, while addressing areas such as artificial intelligence or outer space. Our Common Agenda thus lays out a renewed, more inclusive multilateralism that places prevention and civilian protection at the heart of international action. Alongside the Pact for the Future and the 2024 Future Summit, it envisions coordinating the international community’s efforts in a dynamic, increasingly complex global setting, continuing the vital peacekeeping mission of protecting human dignity, promoting multilateral cooperation, and effectively addressing global crises.
Within this same Common Agenda, there is also a focus on the aspects of complex world crises and the New Agenda for Peace. The first section proposes establishing an Emergency Platform, intended to coordinate an international response to large-scale, high-magnitude crises (such as pandemics or climate disasters), triggered automatically and bringing together leaders, UN agencies, the private sector, and civil society, guided by principles of equity, solidarity, and multilateral collaboration. The second suggests developing a New Agenda for Peace, aimed at overcoming geopolitical tensions and tackling emerging threats — such as the misuse of technology, nuclear risks, or cybersecurity — by adopting global-scale preventive measures, transforming peace missions to make them more flexible and inclusive, promoting gender equality, and integrating youth into decision-making. This proposal, which calls for building a collective security system based on trust and solidarity, aligns with the idea of robust multilateralism that ensures nuclear non-proliferation, preventive diplomacy, and the adaptation of missions to domains like artificial intelligence and climate change.
Hence, Our Common Agenda consolidates efforts to reform peace missions and strengthens the proposal of multilateralism that emphasizes both conflict prevention and protection for humanity in the face of future risks. The recommendations on the New Agenda for Peace bolster this commitment through a convergence of collective security, national investment in prevention, and consideration of climate issues, all in harmony with gender and youth perspectives. Taken as a whole, the document provides a framework for more cohesive, coherent, and responsive international action for the present, pointing toward the construction of a resilient and just future. With this, the relevance of peace missions within the multilateral framework is reaffirmed, laying a foundation for a global commitment that, through cooperation, diplomacy, and innovation, aspires to tackle contemporary crises and anticipate the threats posed to international stability and security.


