The Race for the UN Secretary-Generalship

How the next UN Chief is chosen, what has changed in the process, and why Latin America — and the Dominican Republic — have much to say.

In 2026, while we continue to read headlines about wars, extreme heat waves, refugee crises and democracies on the defensive, something will be decided in New York that rarely appeared on the radar of public opinion: who will be the next person at the helm of the UN.

This is no minor detail. The Secretary-General is, in practice, the face of multilateralism: the person who calls for calm when a war breaks out, who calls for more climate ambition, who tries to mediate when everyone else has left the table. And this time, the process to choose that person comes with new rules, higher expectations… and a Latin America that feels it is “its turn.”

On 25 November 2025, the President of the General Assembly, Annalena Baerbock, and the President of the Security Council sent a joint letter to all countries announcing the formal start of the “race” to succeed António Guterres on 1 January 2027. That letter is not a mere formality: it is the result of a decade of reforms driven by the General Assembly to open up a selection that for years was almost a backroom affair among the great powers.

1. First, the basics: who chooses the Secretary-General?

The Charter of the United Nations says it in a single line: the Secretary-General “shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.” Translated into plain language, the process has two steps:

1. The Security Council filter.
    The Council’s 15 countries discuss names and, when there is sufficient consensus, recommend a single person. Here the five permanent members (the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom), who can veto any candidacy, carry a great deal of weight.
2. Appointment by the General Assembly.
    The 193 States meet in plenary session and, barring a major surprise, approve by acclamation the recommended candidate.

In practice, this has meant that the real contest takes place in the “club of five,” and that the General Assembly has functioned more as a notary than as a protagonist. For decades, names emerged from discreet negotiations between major capitals, and the rest of the world only found out when the white smoke had already risen in New York.

2. From closed rooms to public scrutiny

That began to change in 2015. That year, the General Assembly adopted resolution 69/321, which many diplomats described as “historic” because it was the first to state clearly: the selection of the Secretary-General must be more transparent and inclusive. Among other things, it decided that the President of the Assembly and that of the Council would send a joint letter inviting States to present candidates and that informal dialogues would be organized with the aspirants before all Member States.

In 2016, we saw for the first time the effect of these rules: an official list of candidates was published, their curricula were shared, and the Assembly organized hearings broadcast on the internet in which each candidate set out their vision and answered questions. Subsequent resolutions — 70/305, 71/323, 72/313 — consolidated these practices and added a strong political message: regional rotation and gender balance must be taken into account when choosing who will lead the UN.

In 2023, another key resolution (77/335) openly acknowledged what everyone could see: there has never been a woman at the head of the UN and that must change, “strongly encouraging” States to nominate female candidates.

And in 2025, resolution 79/327 went one step further: it established that the process must begin in the last quarter of the year prior to the end of the current mandate through a joint letter; it requires that each candidacy be presented by at least one Member State; it orders that a public list of candidates be maintained on a UN web page; and it asks that aspirants reveal their sources of funding and, if they work within the UN system, consider suspending their duties during the campaign in order to avoid conflicts of interest.

The letter of 25 November 2025 embodies this spirit: it recalls the call to nominate women, underlines the importance of regional diversity, announces that there will be public dialogues with candidates throughout 2026, and notes that the Security Council will seek to make its recommendation by the end of July that year to allow for an orderly transition.

For the first time, the path to the Secretary-Generalship is filled with visible signposts: indicative dates, vision papers accessible to everyone, broadcast hearings, and a public record of who backs whom.

3. The E10’s battle: rotation, gender and transparency

None of this turn towards openness has been a gift from the great powers. Behind it lie years of pressure from the majority of the membership, including the ten non-permanent seats on the Council (the so-called E10) and the ACT group (Accountability, Coherence and Transparency).

In terms of geographical diversity, there has long been an unwritten notion of regional rotation for the post of Secretary-General. In 2016, it was expected to be Eastern Europe’s “turn” (the only region never before represented), but in the end the person chosen was from Western Europe. For this next selection, many countries — especially from the Global South — insist that rotation must be respected. In fact, several governments argue that it is now Latin America and the Caribbean’s turn to assume the Secretary-Generalship, given that after a European (Guterres, from Portugal) it would be the next region in line. Chile, an active player in these discussions, said so openly: “The principle of regional rotation must be respected, and it is the turn of the Latin American and Caribbean region to hold this post.” Promoting regional diversity does not mean that the best candidate cannot come from another region, but it does underscore a value of fairness: all the world’s regions should have the opportunity to provide leadership to the premier international organization. This also responds to criticism that certain regions or powers dominate the top posts. Thanks to the advocacy of these countries, the 2025 joint letter expressly mentions the “importance of regional diversity” in the candidacies, and geographical balance will surely be a central topic in the public debate about the aspirants.

On gender parity, the progress is both evident and symbolic. In 80 years, the UN has never had a woman as Secretary-General, a fact lamented inside and outside the Organization. During the 2016 process this became very visible — there were 7 female candidates out of 13 — but in the end a man was again elected. The frustration of networks of global women leaders even led to talk of a “hidden hand” pulling strings in the shadows to prevent a woman from reaching the top of the UN. Beyond the graphic nature of the expression, the debate has helped galvanize support for real change.

The ACT group, which includes many E10 members and other States, ensured that resolution 79/327 “regretted” officially the absence of women in the post and strongly encouraged the nomination of female candidates. The joint letter reiterated this point almost verbatim, marking a strong political consensus: the time has come for a woman to lead the UN. Medium-sized countries such as Chile have been blunt: “After 80 years, the time has come for a woman to lead this organization.” Even nations such as Brazil have signalled in international forums that they will support a woman this time. The fact that women are nominated does not guarantee that the final choice will be one, but never before has there been such a clear and shared call for parity. This creates public expectations and moral pressure on Council members to give serious consideration to female candidates.

On transparency and accountability, the gains driven by the E10/ACT are also notable. The obligation to present a written strategic vision, to take part in open dialogues and to disclose financial backers places aspirants under the scrutiny of all Member States and global civil society. A candidate can no longer emerge out of nowhere as the product of an arrangement among powers: they must now publicly articulate their proposals (what is their plan for the UN on peace, development, human rights?) and can be questioned on them. Moreover, with the new rule on financial transparency, if a powerful State or a private actor backs a candidate, that information must be made public, which helps curb hidden “chequebook diplomacy.” The E10 have also argued for a level playing field: hence the recommendation that senior UN officials who run for the post step aside temporarily — preventing, for example, a head of a UN agency from using their job as a campaign platform with an unfair advantage over external candidates. All this promotes fairness among aspirants and confidence that the selection will be based on merit rather than undue influence.

Another important advance is the commitment to keep the entire membership informed throughout the process. Traditionally, once the Council’s deliberations began, the other States were left in the dark until the white smoke appeared. Now, thanks to pressure from the elected members and the backing of resolutions, it is expected that the President of the Council and the President of the Assembly will issue joint periodic communications with updates: how many candidates remain active, what stage the process is at, what steps lie ahead. This internal transparency allows countries to follow the progress and, if necessary, also exercise their diplomatic influence in an informed manner.

4. Latin America says: “It’s our turn”

In this context, the idea that it is “Latin America and the Caribbean’s turn” for the Secretary-Generalship has gained ground. There is no written rule that obliges respect for regional rotation, but there is a political logic that is hard to ignore: after Africa, Asia and Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean has been under-represented at the top of the UN. The only Latin American to have held the post was Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (Peru), from 1982 to 1991.

Today, with a region that asserts itself as a key player on climate crisis, migration and inequality, the demand is stronger. The fact that the Security Council itself has two seats reserved for Latin America and the Caribbean, and that countries from the region are taking on responsibilities in such sensitive issues as Haiti or peace in Ukraine, reinforces the idea that this is not just a symbolic claim but also a call for real leadership on the global agenda.

5. And what about the Dominican Republic?

For the Dominican Republic, none of this is foreign, nor should it be. The country has spent years raising its profile at the UN and in regional politics:

• It was a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 2019–2020 and even presided over it, gaining direct experience in the room where the Secretary-General’s name is decided.
• It is a member of the Human Rights Council for the 2024–2026 period, which gives it a voice in key debates on rights and democracy.
• It is on the front line of the Haitian crisis and has called, together with Kenya, for more international support for the UN-authorized security mission in Haiti at a time when gang violence has the neighbouring country on the brink of collapse.

The suspension of the Summit of the Americas, scheduled for December 2025 in Punta Cana, was undoubtedly a blow: an important showcase to project leadership and bring the hemisphere’s heads of state together on home soil was lost. But it also opens up a different window. The year 2026 will still be full of quiet diplomacy spaces — ministerial meetings, official visits, regional forums — where the region can return to this issue and, in the corridors, start stitching together positions on the election of the next Secretary-General.

All this places the Dominican Republic in a unique position: a Caribbean country, a natural bridge between North and South America, between the Spanish-speaking and English-speaking worlds, and with recent credentials in security, human rights and regional diplomacy.

At a time when Latin America and the Caribbean are claiming their turn to lead the UN, it would be almost a contradiction for the Dominican Republic to watch the process from the stands. On the contrary, it makes perfect sense for it to be one of the active voices in the discussions on candidacies, both within the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC) and in New York.

That does not necessarily mean presenting its own candidate for Secretary-General (although nothing would prevent it), but it does mean:

• Taking part in building a regional consensus on capable, visionary names that understand Caribbean realities, climate change and inequality.
• Publicly demanding transparency and fairness in the process, reinforcing the advances achieved by the revitalization resolutions.
• Making the most of every regional and global platform in 2026 — from hemispheric meetings to debates in Geneva and New York — to put the issue on the agenda, even in informal conversations: so that the selection of the Secretary-General ceases to be a matter for diplomatic elites and starts to be perceived as a debate that matters to societies.

As a medium-sized country with a presence on different boards, the Dominican Republic can play a bridging role: building links between Northern and Southern perspectives, amplifying the Caribbean voice — so affected by climate and insecurity — and reminding everyone that the UN’s legitimacy is also at stake in who leads it.

And, in passing, this active involvement feeds into another discussion that some of us are already starting to have out loud: if the country wants to consolidate its role as a responsible global actor, it is not enough to have “passed through” the Security Council once. It would be reasonable for Santo Domingo to consider launching, towards the end of this decade, a new bid for a non-permanent seat. Returning to the Council table before 2030, with more experience and a clear agenda, would reinforce the message that the Dominican Republic not only has views on the UN’s future, but is willing to assume again the responsibilities that come with that.

6. What awaits the next Secretary-General: a UN in trauma

The debate on rules, regions and gender should not make us forget something essential: the next Secretary-General will not arrive to a blank slate, but to a UN that is already going through a deep crisis. When heads of state met at the General Assembly in September 2025, many encountered an Organization in trauma mode, as a recent International Crisis Group report bluntly puts it.

The diagnosis has two layers. The first is financial and managerial. Massive cuts by the United States — historically the largest contributor — have “eviscerated” parts of the UN system, especially its humanitarian operations. Agencies such as the World Food Programme and UNHCR are laying off staff and cutting rations just as needs are skyrocketing. António Guterres has responded by pushing the UN80 reform initiative, which is already underway and which, between now and 2026, is supposed to reduce the Secretariat’s staff by around one fifth and review thousands of mandates handed down by Member States. One phrase sums up the mood in the glass house: doing “less with less.”

The second layer is political and about credibility. In Gaza, Israel has deliberately kept the UN at arm’s length from both political negotiations and the humanitarian response in a war that has turned into a catastrophe, with famine declared in parts of the Strip. UNRWA, the agency for Palestine refugees, is facing an unprecedented political and financial offensive: it has lost hundreds of staff, facilities and key donors since 2023, and its survival is in doubt.

At the same time, alarms keep going off in Sudan and Haiti: protracted wars, massive sexual violence, near-collapsed States and overwhelmed humanitarian systems. The war between Russia and Ukraine remains bogged down, the situation of the Rohingya in Bangladesh and Myanmar is stalled, and the Security Council — crossed by mutual vetoes — has been unable to offer coherent responses on several of these fronts.

To these hotspots are added the concrete impacts of the cuts in particularly sensitive areas. The Crisis Group report stresses that sexual and reproductive health services in conflict settings are among the hardest hit: the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) has had to close safe spaces for survivors of sexual violence in Sudan and cut support to midwives in Afghanistan, while its funding appeals for women and newborns in Gaza have received only a fraction of what is needed.

In parallel, the UN is trying to push through a review of all its peace operations, mandated by the Pact for the Future adopted in 2024, while sustaining as best it can political and humanitarian missions in Syria, Afghanistan, Haiti, the Sahel and other fragile contexts. But, as the report itself admits, the Organization can no longer be everywhere with the same intensity: reinforcing its presence in certain conflicts will mean cutting back in others.

In this scenario, whoever arrives on the 38th floor of UN headquarters in January 2027 will not only have to deliver inspiring speeches. They will have to:

• Manage cuts and unpopular reforms without destroying the UN’s ability to respond to humanitarian and security crises.
• Defend the multilateral system against a wave of scepticism and nationalism, particularly if major powers continue to opt for unilateral action or undermine basic principles of the Charter, such as the prohibition of the use of force and respect for territorial integrity.
• Keep sensitive agendas alive, such as gender equality and the rights of women and girls in conflict, just when setbacks and funding cuts are the norm.
• Reposition the UN’s good offices diplomacy so that the Organization once again becomes a relevant mediator in wars where, today, decisions made in national capitals weigh more than resolutions adopted in New York.

In other words, whether we like it or not, the next Secretary-General will be a manager of permanent crises: budgetary, political, humanitarian and of legitimacy. The selection process now under way in New York is not just an institutional ritual; it is, de facto, a global job interview for that role. And this is where the discussions on transparency, regional rotation and parity stop being abstract and connect with what really matters: whether the UN is going to face this storm with someone who understands the scale of the challenge… and has the will to take it on.

7. Why should we care?

It may seem that all this is remote, a matter of corridors and protocols. But the person who emerges from this process will not only have a megaphone like few others; they will be piloting a UN with fewer resources, more crises and its reputation on the line. From how climate commitments are negotiated, to how much priority is given to human rights in the face of “realpolitik,” to decisions on Sudan, Haiti or Gaza, their room for manoeuvre will shape issues that affect us increasingly closely.

The new rules do not turn the election into a popular vote, nor do they eliminate vetoes and geopolitical tensions. But they do open a window for:

• High-quality candidacies that previously would not have even entered the conversation because they lacked the prior blessing of the great powers.
• Gender parity and regional diversity to cease being mere lip service and become visible variables that States will have to explain if they choose to ignore them.
• Countries such as the Dominican Republic and the rest of Latin America to have more room to influence, as a bloc, a decision that will shape the course of multilateralism and the response to crises that already hit the region hard (climate, migration, security).
• And, above all, for the debate about “what UN we want for this decade of crises” to take place before it is too late.

From now until the end of 2026, we will see names, programmatic statements and public hearings parade by. It will be easy to switch off and think that it does not matter who wins, especially when the multilateral system seems to be constantly on the defensive. But at a time when the phrase “the UN is useless” is bandied about lightly, the way its leader is chosen will send a powerful message: either that the Organization is willing to look in the mirror and reform itself, or that the old inertia continues to rule even in the middle of a storm.

For once, it is worth following closely what happens in this “global election” without ballot boxes. Not because a good Secretary-General will fix the world single-handedly — no one can, given current cuts, wars and polarization — but because, in times of distrust, any step towards a more open, representative UN that is consistent with the values it preaches is news we badly need.

And because, for Latin America and the Caribbean — and for the Dominican Republic in particular — this may truly be the chance to make its voice heard at the pinnacle of the international system: not only by opining about the UN’s future, but by helping decide who will steer it through one of the most difficult stretches in its history.